ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The Chinese economy has grown at a rapid pace over the last 25 years. This growth has been accompanied by the creation and progressive liberalization of market related institutions and activities, including the creation of two Mainland stock exchanges and the trading of Chinese incorporated firms on overseas exchanges, primarily on the Hong Kong stock exchange (SEHK). Arguably, an important factor in the continued economic development of Chinese incorporated firms will be access to appropriately priced capital. This paper examines the proposition that publicly traded Chinese firms attempt to increase the perceived credibility of their disclosures by engaging auditors perceived as high-quality and committing to SEHK exchange listing requirements.
In this study, we maintain that the (then) Big 5 affiliated audit firms (hereinafter Big 5) are perceived to perform higher quality audits than other auditors and, as such, are able to impart a higher degree of credibility to the disclosures of the firms they audit. Classifying Big 5 auditors as "high-quality" and others as "low-quality" has precedence in earlier studies (see Watkins et al, 2004 for a review of the audit quality literature and the various proxies that have been used to capture the "audit quality" construct). As well, we maintain that Chinese firms that have shares listed on the SEHK are assumed to provide more informative and, thus, more credible, financial disclosures than firms listed exclusively on the Mainland stock exchanges.
The results of this study indicate that firms with higher credibility ratings have higher returns on equity and employ more assets than firms with lower credibility ratings. Additional analyses supports these main findings and also indicate that relatively highly leveraged firms traded on the Mainland are more likely to use Big 5 auditors and that firms traded on the SEHK are larger and more likely to use Big 5 auditors.
The positive relation between the credibility of disclosures and return on equity is consistent with profitable firms making larger investments in credibility enhancement than less profitable firms. The increased investment in credibility enhancement by firms that report higher returns on equity is likely motivated by a desire to have their equity more accurately (and highly) valued. This credibility investment is also consistent with attempting to attract an international (and potentially more financially sophisticated) investment clientele that, presumptively, would place a high value on the independence, expertise, and resulting opinion of perceived high-quality auditors and stringent exchange oversight. Supplemental analyses indicate that a positive relation between credibility of reporting and firm size (as measured by total assets) consistent with larger firms having a greater demand for capital, a capital constituency that demands more information, a greater demand for international investment capital, and, as a result of larger scale and / or broader scope of operations, needing the fuller suite of service offerings available through the large international audit firms. Examining various partitions of the sample firms by components of credibility (auditor and exchange) provides results that indicate firms with relatively high reported return on equity are more likely to employ Big 5 firms and that firms traded on the SEHK are more likely to employ Big 5 firms. With respect to firms listed only on the Mainland, the relation between return on equity and the use of Big 5 firms remains positive and significant. For this subsample of firms we find a positive and significant relation between industry relative leverage and the use of Big 5 firms. This finding is consistent with creditors of relatively highly leveraged firms traded only on Mainland exchanges placing a higher value on Big 5 audits than those of non-Big 5 firms.
A important feature of this study is our ability to construct strong tests of the relative strength of the relation between the perceived need for credible and ongoing signaling through financial reporting of publicly traded firms and determinants of credible financial reporting. Specifically, the ability to gauge the strength of these relations (by examining a sample of relatively homogeneous firms, i.e., Chinese incorporated, publicly traded) is enhanced by the number of audit firms involved (particularly with respect to the Mainland only traded firms) 2 and that the firms themselves are traded on exchanges that differ in operationally significant ways. Such tests are less easily constructed examining firms listed on more well-established exchanges (e.g., NYSE, London Exchange) where auditor concentration is much higher and exchange operations similar. As well, by examining ongoing performance and operating measures of significant interest to investors and importance to corporate management (i.e., annual performance evidenced by return on equity, size, industry relative leverage) versus one-time or dichotomous events (i.e., IPOs, qualified audit opinions) the study addresses directly the continuing demand for quality differentiated audits and exchanges. The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the conditions that give rise to a demand for quality differentiated audit services and exchange listing are discussed as are a number of institutional features unique to Chinese firms that may distort the traditional sources of demand. The hypotheses tested in this study are stated and the research design is presented. The third section presents the data collection process and descriptive statistics. The fourth section provides empirical results and discussion. The fifth section summarizes the findings, our conclusions, and avenues for future research.
DEMAND BY CHINESE FIRMS FOR HIGH QUAITY AUDIT SERVICES AND EXCHANGES, HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT, AND RESEARCH DESIGN Quality Differentiated Audit Services
As China attempts to attract appropriately priced capital from domestic and international sources, it is likely that the traditional features that accompany exchange traded equity shares and publicly traded debt will have to be adopted and / or further developed. Among these features is the credibility enhancement provided by high quality audit services.
As discussed in DeAngelo (1981) and largely subscribed to in subsequent audit research, high quality audit services are possible when the auditor understands the economic activity of the entity being audited and has the incentive and ability to ensure disclosure of that information to potentially interested parties. One generally assumed demand factor for high quality audit services is the reduction in investor uncertainty and consequent reduction in cost of capital for firms reporting value accretive information from the provision of more credible information. Failure of the auditor to consistently provide credible information (e.g., attesting to the validity of a high reported return on equity when, in fact, the high reported return on equity is an artifact of misrepresenting the economic circumstances of the firm) will inevitably diminish the audit firm's reputation and, with it, the audit firm's ability to conduct business profitably.
The audit industry in China has grown along with the economy (Lin and Chen, 2004) . However, audit quality in China has been questioned and, with it, the reliability of reported financial information of Chinese firms. DeFond et al. (2000) and Li et al. (2005) , among others, provide evidence consistent with the incidence of low quality Chinese audit firm audits (as opposed to Chinese affiliates of international audit firms operating in China).
An institutional factor that likely contributed to the demand for "compliant" as opposed to traditional high quality auditing is identified by Wong (2005) . Wong argues that the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges (i.e., the Mainland Chinese exchanges) operate as "casinos," characterized by tight controls over the number of shares and the price at which corporate shares can be offered in an IPO. Limiting the number of shares that can be issued in IPOs and systematically setting the offering price below the anticipated closing price on the first day of trading largely ensures that initial investors will make money. Empirical evidence reported by Wong indicates that Chinese IPOs are significantly oversubscribed (so much so that shares are awarded on a lottery system).
Listing on SEHK Versus the Mainland Exchanges
As with auditors, exchanges provide controls and perform an oversight role with respect to listed firms. These views of the importance of the SEHK are consistent with the data reported in Sung (2005) that identifies the SEHK as an important conduit for capital to Chinese firms.
Formally, the hypotheses are examined in the study are as follows: H1: Chinese firms that report high returns on equity are more likely to invest in credibility enhancing disclosure practices than other firms H2: Large Chinese firms with significant demand for capital are more likely to invest in credibility enhancing disclosure practices than other firms H3: Highly leveraged Chinese firms are more likely to invest in credibility enhancing disclosure practices than other firms To test the study's hypotheses the following probit regression 6 is estimated:
where, Standards." The new accounting standards are expected to be largely compliant with International Accounting Standards though will keep some Chinese characteristics consistent with China's economic situation. 5 Arguably, the history and conditions of operation of the SEHK suggest that the firms traded on it are valued based on economic fundamentals. The SEHK is one of the largest stock exchanges in the world with approximately $1 trillion in market capitalization. Ownership of shares on the SEHK is relatively stable (e.g., volatility statistics from 2005 suggest that there is less turnover on the SEHK than on either the NASDAQ or New York stock exchanges). 6 The model Chi-squares for each of the probit models estimated are not significant at conventional levels. We discount these results, consistent with the view proffered by Kennedy (1993) that "There is no universally accepted goodness-of-fit for probit…measure of reported for probit estimation."
Credibility
by a Big 5 affiliated audit firm, and 2 if firm listed on Hong Kong exchange and audited by a Big 5 affiliated audit firm 7 ROE = Return on equity defined as net income divided by book equity LogAssets = Log of total assets RELDA = Firm i total liabilities divided by total assets less industry mean total liabilities divided by total assets, where industry is defined by 2 digit SIC code. H1, H2, and H3 will each be accepted if β 1, β 2, and β 3, respectively, are positive and significant.
The demand for credible information is hypothesized to be a function of three factors. First, it is hypothesized that the quality of the story to be told will affect the demand for credibility. Specifically, it is expected that high performing firms will have a relatively higher demand for credible reporting since their "better" economic stories are less likely to be accepted at face value than the "bad" economic stories of less well performing firms. Second, it is hypothesized that large firms with significant demand for capital will have incentives to provide credible information to capital providers to obtain financing on good terms. Lastly, it is hypothesized that firms that use relatively more debt financing than others firms operating in their industry and, presumably, confronting comparable risks have an incentive to provide credible information to debt providers to obtain good terms on debt financing.
The hypotheses examined in this study contemplate that Chinese incorporated firms can effectively differentiate the credibility of their disclosures by employing audit firms perceived as high quality and listing on the SEHK, arguably a more well established exchange than the Mainland exchanges and perceived as having more complete disclosure requirements. Table 2 presents the results from estimating equation [1] . Consistent with hypothesis 1, the coefficient on return on equity is positive and significant at the .05 level, one-tail test. This result indicates that, all else equal, firms reporting positive return on equity are more likely to make credibility enhancing investments than less profitable firms.
DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

REGRESSION RESULTS
The finding supports H1. The positive and significant coefficient on LogAssets indicates that, all else equal, larger firms as well are more likely to make credibility enhancing investments. The finding supports H2. The negative coefficient on industry relative leverage is insignificantly different from zero. This result is inconsistent with H3 and, as noted earlier, is open to multiple interpretations, e.g., more highly leveraged companies are less able to meet the listing requirements for the SEHK. Credibility = 0 if the firm not listed on the SEHK or audited by a Big 5 affiliated audit firm, 1 if the firm is listed on the SEHK or audited by a Big 5 affiliated audit firm, and 2 if the firm is listed on the SEHK and audited by a Big 5 affiliated audit firm ROE = Return turn on equity defined as net income divided by book equity LogAssets = Log of total assets RELDA = Firm i Total liabilities divided by total assets less industry mean total liabilities divided by total assets, where industry is defined by 2 digit SIC code.
To test whether the strength of the relation between the components of credibility (auditor and exchange) and the explanatory variables differs systematically, the probit regressions are run for the full sample and for the sample split by auditor and exchange.
Auditor as dependent variable
In Table 3 , we report the results of regressing auditor type on the explanatory variables from Equation [1] along with exchange. For the full sample of firms, the results indicate a positive and significant relation between high quality auditor and both return on equity and exchange. The former result is consistent with H1 and the relation between auditor type and exchange is consistent with firms listing on the SEHK being much more likely to use a Big 5 auditor. (results not shown) . For the full sample of firms, the results indicate a positive and significant relation between listing on the SEHK and firm size and a positive and significant relation between listing on the SEHK and the use of a Big 5 auditor. These findings are consistent with large firms listing on the SEHK and employing high quality auditors to more readily appeal to international capital providers. Second, we regress the exchange indicator variable on the explanatory variables for firms segregated by auditor type. The results indicate that large firms audited by Big 5 firms are more likely to be traded on the SEHK. Interestingly, we also find that firms with high industry relative leverage audited by Big 5 firms are more likely to trade on the Mainland exchange. This result is consistent with highly leveraged firms traded on the Mainland exchanges benefiting more from the credibility enhancement of a Big 5 audit. Third, we regress auditor type on the explanatory variables for subsamples of firms traded on the Mainland and SEHK exchanges, respectively. While the relation between high quality auditor and return on equity is positive in the separate regressions, the relation is significant only with respect to firms listed only on the Mainland exchange. This finding is consistent with profitable firms traded on the Mainland exchanges placing a relatively high value on the credibility enhancement offered by the Big 5 firms. These findings are also consistent with those reported in DeFond et al. (2000) that the flight from quality audits on the Mainland did not significantly affect the Big 5 firms. The relation between high quality auditor and industry relative leverage is positive in the separate regressions, though the relation is significant at the .10 level only with respect to firms listed on the Mainland exchange. This finding is consistent with these firms using high levels of leverage relative to their industries placing a relatively high value on the credibility enhancement offered by the Big 5 firms. The coefficients on the log of assets are not significant in either of the industry regressions.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study examines publicly traded Chinese firms to identify factors that result in their investing in more credible financial reporting. The evidence we report is substantially consistent with our hypotheses, supporting the interpretation that Chinese firms make investments in information enhancement in predictable ways, much akin to their Western counterparts.
Empirical results for the entire sample of firms are consistent with these firms investing in high quality auditing when they report high returns on equity and are large. These results are broadly consistent with those reported in Davidson and Neu (1993) , Teoh and Wong (1993) , Jang and Lin (1993) , and Krishnan (2003) . An important contribution of this study is the examination and resulting better understanding of the factors that affect when and how Chinese firms of growing economic significance are enhancing the information they report to financial statement users.
Splitting the sample by factors that are maintained to influence financial reporting credibility reveals interesting patterns. Focusing on firm choice of auditor, the evidence is consistent with firms reporting high returns on equity using Big 5 auditors. Subsample analysis indicates that the positive relation between high returns on equity and the use of Big 5 auditors is driven by firms trading on the Mainland exchanges. This finding is consistent with profitable Mainland firms facing the most significant credibility issues and, in response, seeking to enhance the information they report by using a Big 5 auditor. Focusing on firm choice of exchange, the evidence indicates that firms trading on the SEHK are more likely to be large and use Big 5 auditors. This is consistent with these firms needing greater access to international capital markets. Subsample analysis indicates that SEHK traded firms audited by Big 5 firms are larger
